The Legal Rights of Nonsmokers in the Workplace by Paolella, Raymond L.




The Surgeon General first suggested that nonsmokers
might be harmed by exposure to tobacco smoke in his 1972
report on the health consequences of smoking.1 Since 1972,
numerous studies have produced growing medical and scien-
tific evidence showing that such harms are substantial.2 Most
recently, in December of 1986 the Surgeon General issued an
unprecedented report stating unequivocally that the inhalation
of smoke from other people's cigarettes causes lung cancer and
other diseases in healthy nonsmokers.3
To protect nonsmokers from involuntary smoking, most
states have enacted legislation that restricts smoking in public
places.4 However, nonsmokers are probably most vulnerable to
serious harm from exposure to tobacco smoke in the workplace
because they spend relatively large amounts of time at work.
Only a handful of states has imposed effective restrictions on
smoking in the workplace.5
When legislatures fail to address an important health issue
such as this, people naturally turn to the courts for relief.
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1. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 117-35
(1972).
2. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
3. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 7 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 REPORT].
4. Id. at 266.
5. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.414 (West 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5704
(1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (1986). Washington currently has no state-
imposed restrictions on smoking in the workplace.
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Nonsmokers have had considerable success in obtaining judi-
cial relief, and litigation by nonsmokers against their employ-
ers is likely to become increasingly common in the near future.
This article will examine the legal rights of nonsmokers
based upon the common law right to a safe workplace, federal
and state laws protecting handicapped persons, other tort theo-
ries, various federal and state statutory provisions, administra-
tive regulations, and local ordinances. Although strong
emphasis will be placed on the legal rights of nonsmokers in
the workplace, the rights of nonsmokers in public places will
also be discussed. The main focus is on Washington law; how-
ever, the common law and federal law theories discussed in
this article should be viable in many other jurisdictions
throughout the United States.'
II. THE HARM FROM INVOLUNTARY SMOKING
Regardless of which legal theory a nonsmoker may
employ to assert his or her rights to smoke-free air, it is essen-
tial that the decision-making tribunal be presented with a com-
prehensive and persuasive factual record that clearly outlines
the harmful effects of tobacco smoke on nonsmokers. An
exhaustive and persuasive factual record will likely be the sin-
gle most important factor in convincing a court to apply or
expand a common law legal doctrine to protect nonsmokers.
This was clearly demonstrated in Shimp v. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co.,7 the landmark case which first invoked the
well-settled common law right to a safe workplace for the ben-
efit of a nonsmoking employee. Therefore, some of the most
potent factual data on the harm from involuntary smoking will
be reviewed.
6. Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the
issue, lower federal courts have decided that there is no constitutionally protected
right to breathe air that is free from tobacco smoke contamination. In Gasper v.
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979), the plaintiffs brought an
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin the Louisiana Stadium and
Exposition District from continuing to allow tobacco smoking in the Louisiana
Superdome during events staged there. The plaintiffs claimed a constitutional right to
smoke-free air based upon the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. The Gasper court held that there was no such constitutional right.
Accord, Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983) (political question);
Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926
(1979) (no constitutional question).
7. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
[Vol. 10:591
Legal Rights Of Nonsmokers
A. Constituents of Tobacco Smoke
When a nonsmoker is present in a smoke-filled room, he
or she is in fact smoking because normal inhalation exposes
the nonsmoker to many of the same constituents of tobacco
smoke that voluntary smokers experience.8 Tobacco smoke is
derived from two sources: sidestream smoke and mainstream
smoke.' Sidestream smoke emerges directly from the end of
the burning tobacco product; mainstream smoke is first inhaled
by the smoker and then enters the environment. 10 Sidestream
smoke contains higher concentrations of many known toxic
and carcinogenic agents than mainstream smoke.'1
Scientists have identified over 3,800 substances in tobacco
smoke.' 2 Upwards of 90% of cigarette smoke is composed
largely of a dozen gases that are hazardous to health. 3 In
addition, in each cubic centimeter of cigarette smoke, there are
about one billion particles small enough to penetrate to the
farthest recesses of the lung.'4 Nationally, cigarette smokers
introduce an estimated 2.25 million metric tons of gaseous and
inhalable particulate matter into the indoor environment each
year. 
5
Some of the toxic and carcinogenic agents contained in
environmental tobacco smoke include carbon monoxide,
nitrogen dioxide, acetone, benzene, benzo(a)pyrene, N-
nitrosodimethylamine, and nicotine. 6 The main irritants in
tobacco smoke are respirable particulates, aldehydes, phenol,
ammonia, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and toluene. 7 Also
8. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11-5 (1979).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 1986 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
12. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE, MEASURING EXPOSURES AND ASSESSING HEALTH
EFFECTS 2 (1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
13. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, THE
SMOKING DIGEST 17 (1977) [hereinafter SMOKING DIGEST].
14. Id. at 18.
15. Repace, The Problem of Passive Smoking, 57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 936
(1981) [hereinafter Passive Smoking].
16. 1986 REPORT, supra note 3, at 134. Tobacco smoke contains substances which
are pharmacologically active, toxic, mutagenic, carcinogenic, and antigenic. OFFICE ON
SMOKING AND HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, A STATEMENT ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING (1986)
[hereinafter HEALTH EFFECTS].
17. 1986 REPORT, supra note 3, at 227.
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contained in tobacco smoke are particles that emit ionizing
radiation, which when inhaled may cause cancer.'
Moreover, several studies show that in rooms where smok-
ers are present, carbon monoxide and other toxic substances
are commonly found in concentrations that exceed by several
times the maximum levels allowed by federal air quality stan-
dards; such concentrations in outdoor air would trigger the
immediate declaration of an air pollution emergency.19 Three
or four hours after a nonsmoker leaves such a smoky environ-
ment, carbon monoxide is still in the bloodstream.
20
B. The Nature and Extent of the Harm
As previously noted, the Surgeon General has concluded
that involuntary smoking causes lung cancer and other dis-
eases in healthy nonsmokers.2 ' Another recent study on invol-
untary smoking was conducted under the auspices of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 2 This study con-
cluded that about 5,000 nonsmokers die each year from lung
cancer caused by involuntary smoking.23
If these 5,000 involuntary smoking deaths are distributed
proportionately throughout the United States, then a simple
calculation based upon U.S. population census data yields a fig-
ure of 91 nonsmoker deaths per year from involuntary smok-
ing in the State of Washington.24 Significantly, another
independent study estimated that 89.5 nonsmokers die each
year from lung cancer in Washington due to involuntary
18. For a discussion of the radioactivity of tobacco smoke, see PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING, CANCER AND CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE IN THE WORKPLACE, A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 460-61 (1985).
19. HEALTH EFFECTS, supra note 16; SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 13, at 24-26;
AMERICAN LUNG ASS'N, SECOND-HAND SMOKE 3, 4 (1985) [hereinafter SECOND-HAND
SMOKE].
20. SECOND-HAND SMOKE, supra note 19, at 4.
21. 1986 REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
22. Repace and Lowrey, A Quantitative Estimate of Nonsmokers' Lung Cancer
Risk From Passive Smoking, 11 ENV'T INT'L 3 (1985).
23. Id. at 3. To place the health risk in perspective, the study's authors state that
the number of passive smoking fatalities is at least 70 times greater than the total
number of fatalities from the airborne carcinogens currently regulated by the EPA.
Id. at 12.
24. In 1980, the U.S. had a population of 226,545,805. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986 (106th ed.
1985). In 1980, Washington had a population of 4,132,204. WASH. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT, WASH. STATE DATA BOOK: 1985 (1985). Thus, Washington's share of
passive smoking deaths is (4,132,204 divided by 226,545,805) x (5,000) = 91.
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smoking.25 This Washington study concluded that "passive cig-
arette smoke is likely the most dangerous air pollutant we face
today."2
A recent Canadian study has concluded that "[t]obacco
smoke, which contains over 50 known carcinogens and many
other toxic agents, is a health hazard for nonsmokers who are
regularly exposed to it while at work... The evidence on the
composition of tobacco smoke and on the health hazards of
involuntary exposure suggests that there may not be a 'safe'
level for such exposure."27 Other studies have shown that
involuntary smoking harms certain lung functions,2" results in
double the lung cancer risk,29 and adversely affects persons
with heart disease. s°
Similarly, studies show that involuntary smoking may be
harmful to fetuses and children. When nonsmoking pregnant
women are exposed to passive tobacco smoke, the fetal blood
picks up significant amounts of toxic tobacco smoke byprod-
ucts.3 1 Also, involuntary smoking by small children results in
significantly increased respiratory infections manifested as
pneumonia and bronchitis.2  Because of these risks, the
National Academy of Sciences recently recommended that
25. Office of Public Health Laboratories and Epidemiology, Washington
Department of Social and Health Services, Passive Smoking: Myth or Reality, 1 WASH.
MORBIDITY REP., No. 2 (May-June 1984). The Washington study also states that
dangerous levels of tobacco smoke carcinogens have been measured at many indoor
locations. Id. at 4.
26. Id. See also Repace and Lowrey, Indoor Air Pollution, Tobacco Smoke, and
Public Health, 208 SCI. 464, 471 (May 2, 1980) ("Clearly, indoor air pollution from
tobacco smoke presents a serious risk to the health of nonsmokers.").
27. Collishaw, Kirkbride & Wigle, Tobacco Smoke in the Workplace: An
Occupational Health Hazard, 131 CAN. MED. A. J. 1199 (1984).
28. White & Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers Chronically
Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 720 (1980) (An exhaustive study of
2,100 subjects concluded that "chronic exposure to tobacco smoke in the work
environment is deleterious to the nonsmoker and significantly reduces small-airways
function.").
29. Hirayama, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of
Lung Cancer: A Study From Japan, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 183 (1981) (In a 14 year study of
91,540 nonsmoking Japanese wives, Dr. Takeshi Hirayama found that wives with
smoking husbands had double the risk of lung cancer than wives with nonsmoking
husbands.).
30. Aronow, Effect of Passive Smoking on Angina Pectoris, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED.
21 (1978) (passive smoking aggravates angina pectoris and causes adverse effects in
persons with coronary heart disease).
31. Bottoms, Kuhnert, Kuhnert, and Reese, Maternal Passive Smoking and Fetal
Serum Thiocyanate Levels, 144 Am. J. OBsTET. GENECOL. 787 (1982).
32. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 9.
1987]
596 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 10:591
tobacco smoke be eliminated from the environments of small
children."3
In terms of physical discomfort, studies indicate that large
percentages of nonsmokers have difficulty working near smok-
ers,3 4 and experience various types of physical distress from
exposure to tobacco smoke.3 5 Based in part on the irritating
and noxious effects of involuntary smoking, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences has recommended that smoking be banned on
all commercial airline flights.
3 6
On the economic front, a report from the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, Congress's scientific advisory agency, esti-
mated that disease and lost productivity due to smoking cost
this nation about $65 billion a year, $43 billion in lost produc-
tivity and $22 billion in health care expenses. Similarly,
other researchers have concluded that employers incur signifi-
cantly increased costs when they permit smoking in the
workplace.3 8
Finally, the harmful effects of involuntary smoking have
recently been recognized by the Washington Legislature. The
legislative intent section of the Washington Clean Indoor Air
33. Id.
34. Passive Smoking, supra note 15, at 939 (study of more than 10,000 nonsmoking
office workers reported that more than 50 percent of the nonsmokers had difficulty
working near a smoker. Another 36 percent said they were forced to move away from
their desks or work stations because of passive smoking).
35. SECOND-HAND SMOKE, supra note 19, at 5 (study showed that 70 percent of
nonsmokers suffer from eye irritations caused by smoke. Even among nonsmokers
with no allergies, 30 percent developed headaches and nasal discomfort from tobacco
smoke, while 25 percent experienced coughing). For some nonsmokers, smoke-
induced eye tearing can be so intense as to be incapacitating. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COuNCa, supra note 12, at 8.
36. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 13. As to indoor locations
generally, the Surgeon General has concluded that "[t]he simple separation of smokers
and nonsmokers within the same air space may reduce, but does not eliminate, the
exposure of nonsmokers to environmental tobacco smoke." 1986 REPORT, supra note
3, at 7.
37. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SMOKING-RELATED
DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS, STAFF MEMORANDUM 4 (Sept. 1985).
38. According to the Smoking Policy Institute at Seattle University, on average,
the employee who smokes wastes six percent of his working hours with the smoking
ritual; takes 50 percent more sick leave; uses a health care system at least 50 percent
more; and imposes greater maintenance costs on the employer to meet building code
requirements on air standards. Berkman, Warning: Smoking Cigarettes May Reduce
Your Chances For a Job, 40 CANCER NEWS 14 (Winter 1986). Based on these economic
considerations, a business administration professor has computed the incremental costs
associated with employees who smoke to be approaching $5,000 per smoker per year.
Weis, Can You Afford to Hire Smokers?, 26 PERSONNEL AD. 71 (1981).
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Act 9 provides:
The legislature recognizes the increasing evidence that
tobacco smoke in closely confined places may create a dan-
ger to the health of some citizens of this state. In order to
protect the health and welfare of those citizens, it is neces-
sary to prohibit smoking in public places except in areas des-
ignated as smoking areas.4 0
Involuntary smoking causes a variety of harmful effects in
nonsmokers, including lung cancer. The accumulating body of
knowledge concerning these harms will likely be a crucial fac-
tor in motivating the courts to fashion legal remedies for
nonsmokers.
III. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT To A SAFE
AND HEALTHFUL WORKPLACE
The nonsmoker has an important common law right to a
safe and healthful workplace. Relying on this common law
right, courts have held that employers may be enjoined from
allowing smoking in the workplace. 4 ' A key issue in Washing-
ton is whether the Workers' Compensation Act exclusive rem-
edy provisions bar an employee from seeking money damages
from, or injunctive relief against, his or her employer.
A. An Employee's Common Law Cause of Action
In the absence of legislation, the common law can provide
protection for nonsmokers in the workplace. Every employer
has a common law duty to maintain a safe and healthful work-
place.4 2 Courts have held that the presence of tobacco smoke
in the workplace is a breach of this duty.
The landmark case involving nonsmokers' rights to a
smoke-free workplace is Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone
Co.4 13 In this 1976 case, the New Jersey court decided that an
employer which permitted smoking in the workplace breached
its affirmative duty to provide its employees with a work area
free from unsafe conditions.
In Shimp, the plaintiff's employer allowed its employees
to smoke while on the job at desks situated in the plaintiff's
39. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.160.010-.900 (1985).
40. 1985 Wash. Laws ch. 236, § 1 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.010 (1985)).
41. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
42. Richardson v. City of Spokane, 67 Wash. 621, 122 P. 330 (1912).
43. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
19871
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work area. Affidavits from the plaintiff's attending physicians
confirmed that she was allergic to cigarette smoke." Passive
inhalation of smoke caused severe throat irritation, nasal irri-
tation sometimes taking the form of nosebleeds, irritation to
the eyes resulting in corneal abrasion and corneal erosion,
headaches, nausea, and vomiting.4 5 The plaintiff used existing
grievance mechanisms in an unsuccessful attempt to alleviate
the situation. An exhaust fan was installed in plaintiff's work
area; however, this action proved unsuccessful.46
Finally, the employee sought injunctive relief from the
court to enjoin smoking as an unsafe working condition. The
court held that employees have a common law right to a safe
and healthful work environment, and employers have a
concomitant affirmative duty to provide a safe work
environment.47
The court took "judicial notice of the toxic nature of ciga-
rette smoke and its well known association with emphysema,
lung cancer and heart disease. 14 8 The court also stated that
"[t]here can be no doubt that the by-products of burning
tobacco are toxic and dangerous to the health of smokers and
nonsmokers generally and this plaintiff in particular. ' 49 After
reviewing the plethora of affidavits and scientific evidence
presented, the court concluded:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke
contaminates and pollutes the air, creating a health hazard
not merely to the smoker but to all those around her who
must rely upon the same air supply. The right of an individ-
ual to risk his or her own health does not include the right
to jeopardize the health of those who must remain around
him or her in order to properly perform the duties of their
jobs. The portion of the population which is especially sensi-
tive to cigarette smoke is so significant that it is reasonable
to expect an employer to foresee health consequences and to
impose upon him a duty to abate the hazard which causes
the discomfort.5 0
Finally, the court noted that the employer had already




48. Id at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
49. Id at 526, 368 A.2d at 413.
50. Id at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415-16.
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prohibited smoking around its machinery to prevent damage
from tobacco smoke. The judge stated that a "company which
has demonstrated such concern for its mechanical components
should have at least as much concern for its human beings. "51
The court then ordered the employer to prohibit smoking in
the plaintiff's work area.
In Smith v. Western Electric Co., 5 2 the Missouri Court of
Appeals likewise held that an injunction is appropriate to pre-
vent irreparable harm to an employee from tobacco smoke in
the workplace.53 The Smith court, citing Shimp, recognized
the well-settled duty of an employer "to use all reasonable care
to provide a reasonably safe workplace" for its employees. 54
The court also held that "smoking in the work area is hazard-
ous to the health of employees in general and plaintiff in
particular.
55
In contrast to Smith and Shimp, an employee who sought
money damages from her former employer for negligent fail-
ure to provide a smoke-free workplace was denied relief in
Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research, Inc.51 In Gordon, the
plaintiff-employee was terminated when she refused to work
in an area containing tobacco smoke.5 7 The court recognized
the common law duty of an employer to provide a reasonably
safe workplace. But the court also stated that "the common
law does not impose upon an employer the duty or burden to
conform his workplace to the particular needs or sensitivities
of an individual employee."5"
However, the Gordon court stated that its decision was
"readily distinguishable" from Shimp because the plaintiff in
Gordon failed to present scientific evidence on the deleterious
effects of tobacco smoke on nonsmokers in general.5 9 In con-
trast, the Shimp court was presented with a plethora of scien-
51. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
52. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
53. In Smith, the plaintiff suffered a severe adverse reaction to tobacco smoke.
The employer offered plaintiff an ineffective respirator and a job in the computer
room (where smoking was prohibited) with a decrease in pay of $500 per month. Id. at
12. The court found these steps to be inadequate. Id.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id at 13.
56. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
57. Id at 11-12.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id
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tific studies and affidavits of medical experts on the general
deleterious harms to nonsmokers from tobacco smoke.
The lesson from Gordon is clear. To prevail on a common
law theory, a nonsmoking plaintiff must demonstrate that
tobacco smoke is harmful both to himself and to nonsmokers
in general. The importance of an extensive, persuasive factual
foundation to prove deleterious harm from tobacco smoke can-
not be overstated.
In Washington, it is also well-settled law that an employer
has an affirmative and continuing duty to provide its employ-
ees with a reasonably safe place of work.60 Further, the
employer must take the precautions of an ordinarily prudent
man in keeping the workplace reasonably safe. 61  Recently
enacted occupational safety and health statutes6 2 represent to
some extent a codification of these long-established common
law principles but do not, however, provide employees with a
judicially enforceable remedy.63 Significantly, these statutes do
not preempt common law remedies,' and they contain policy
declarations that could perhaps buttress the assertion of
another legal theory.65
60. Guy v. Northwest Bible College, 64 Wash. 2d 116, 390 P.2d 708 (1964) (college
employee awarded damages for personal injury sustained on college grounds due to
employer's breach of duty to provide safe workplace); Richardson v. City of Spokane,
67 Wash. 621, 122 P. 330 (1912) (city employee awarded damages for personal injury
sustained on bridge due to employer's negligent failure to maintain a safe workplace);
Ward v. CECO Corp., 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (1985) (court recognized the
continuing validity of an employer's common law duty to provide safe workplace).
61. Myers v. Little Church by the Side of the Rd., 37 Wash. 2d 897, 227 P.2d 165
(1951).
62. E.g., Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-658 (1982); Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA), WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.17.010-.910 (1985).
63. There is no direct or implied private right of action under OSHA. Johnson v.
Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981). While Washington courts have not
directly ruled on the issue, they have apparently assumed that as with OSHA there is
no private right of action to enforce WISHA. See, e.g., Ward v. CECO Corp., 40 Wash.
App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (1985) (violation of WISHA or its regulations constitutes
negligence per se; no reference made to bringing a cause of action directly under
WISHA).
64. OSHA states that its provisions shall not "be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect . . . the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers ... with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or
in the course of, employment." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982).
65. The OSHA "general duty" clause provides that every employer "shall furnish
to each of his employees . . .a place of employment .. .free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). The WISHA "general duty" clause provides
that each employer "[s]hall furnish to each of his employees a place of employment
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Thus far, no reported Washington court has directly
decided whether an employer's common law duty to provide a
safe workplace includes the obligation not to subject employees
to involuntary smoking. But in McCarthy v. Department of
Social and Health Services," a Washington appellate court
appeared to recognize the viability of a common law negligence
action against an employer by an employee who has been
harmed by involuntary smoking in the workplace. The Shimp
and Smith decisions provide strong persuasive precedent to
which Washington courts should look for guidance when such
a case does arise.
This cause of action may be expressly recognized in the
near future by Washington courts because of the rapidly
accumulating data demonstrating that tobacco smoke in the
workplace constitutes an unhealthy and unsafe condition.67
That data has already motivated some employers68 and legisla-
tive bodies 69 to develop increasingly stringent restrictions on
smoking in various places. The growing trend to restrict smok-
ing is an indication that our society has reached a point in time
where the ordinarily prudent employer protects its employees
free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause serious injury or death
to his employeees." WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060 (1985). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE
R. 296-24-020 (1986) (employer must provide a "safe and healthful working
enviornment").
66. 46 Wash. App. 125, 133, 730 P.2d 681, 686 (1986) (stating that if plaintiff can
prove that her smoke-based lung disease was not compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act and was contracted because of her employer's negligence, then "she
has a common law action for negligence").
67. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., Pacific Northwest Bell has completely banned smoking in all of its
facilities, while the Boeing Co. is working toward a smoking ban affecting 100,000
employees nationwide. Tacoma News-Tribune, Dec. 20, 1985, at C-15, col. 3.
69. In 1983 the City of Seattle restricted smoking in many public places. SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 10.64.010-.060 (1986). In 1984 Pierce County enacted a
stringent ban on smoking in both public places and private workplaces. PIERCE
COUNTY, WASH., COUNTY CODE §§ 8.16.010-.160 (1986). On July 28, 1985 the
Washington Clear Indoor Air Act became effective. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.160.010-
900 (1985) (smoking unlawful unless in a specifically "designated smoking area").
Significantly, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.010 (1985) provides:
The legislature recognizes the increasing evidence that tobacco smoke in
closely confined places may create a danger to the health of some citizens of
this state. In order to protect the health and welfare of those citizens, it is
necessary to prohibit smoking in public places except in areas designated as
smoking areas.
In late 1986, both the City of Seattle and King county adopted ordinances requiring
smoke-free workplaces in all facilities operated by those governmental entities. Seat-
tle, Wash., Ordinance 113148 (Oct. 29, 1986); King County, Wash., Ordinance 7884 (Dec.
24, 1986).
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from passive tobacco smoke pursuant to the employer's com-
mon law duty.7 °
Once employers are held liable for tobacco smoke harms,
the assumption of risk doctrine will not be a defense. This doc-
trine, which formerly was available to insulate employers from
liability in some cases, has been abolished in negligence actions
by employees against employers.7 However, comparative neg-
ligence principles may apply if the employee's voluntary expo-
sure to the risk is unreasonable under the circumstances. 72
The type of relief requested in a tort action against an
employer will depend on the circumstances. Money damages
are most appropriate in the situation where the harm has
already occurred and is no longer present, such as harm sus-
tained from tobacco smoke at a former place of employment.
But injunctive relief 73 will be the optimum remedy for an
ongoing exposure to tobacco smoke which might result in
greater harm or disability over time if unabated.
A continuing health threat from regular exposure to
workplace tobacco smoke that may result in future irreparable
harm presents a strong case for equitable relief.74 Inadequacy
of the legal remedy becomes almost self-evident because the
ongoing exposure will require either a multiplicity of damage
lawsuits or because the legal remedy may not be available until
some future date when the harm becomes more serious or per-
70. In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976),
the court held that employers could reasonably foresee the deleterious health
consequences of workplace tobacco smoke to nonsmoking employees. Id. at 531, 368
A.2d at 415.
71. Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
72. Id at 319, 373 P.2d at 773. The employee's knowledge and appreciation of the
risk is an important factor in this analysis. Id.
73. In Washington, a party seeking an injunction must establish
(1) that he has a clear legal or equitable right, (2) that he has a well grounded
fear of immediate invasion of that right by the one against whom the
injunction is sought, and (3) that the acts complained of are either resulting
in or will result in actual and substantial injury to him.
National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. O'Sullivan Grange No. 1136,
35 Wash. App. 444, 454, 667 P.2d 1105, 1111 (1983).
74. In deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the court may balance the
equities by considering the following factors:
(a) the character of the interest to be protected, (b) the relative adequacy to
the plaintiff of injunction in comparison with other remedies, (c) the delay, if
any, in bringing suit, (d) the misconduct of the plaintiff if any, (e) the relative
hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to
the plaintiff if it is denied, (f) the interest of third persons and of the public,
and (g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
Radach v. Gunderson, 39 Wash. App. 392, 398, 695 P.2d 128, 132 (1985).
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manent in nature. Under such circumstances, preventing the
future harm by enjoining workplace smoking should be appro-
priate and feasible to enforce.75
The employee's common law right to a safe and healthful
workplace is a very significant source of protection for non-
smokers. It provides a sound basis for imposing liability on an
employer that negligently fails to protect its employees from
involuntary workplace smoking.
B. Employer Immunity from Common Law Damage Suits
In a tort action for smoke-related damages, the employer
is likely to claim immunity from suit based upon the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Washington Workers' Compensation
Act. 7' By their express terms, these exclusive remedy provi-
sions immunize employers by barring employees from bring-
ing a civil action against an employer for personal injuries
sustained in the course of employment.77 Instead, the injured
75. There should be no significant hardship to the enjoined employer since
restrictions on workplace smoking actually save the employer money in maintenance
costs, consumption of employer-provided fringe benefits, and lost productivity. See
supra note 38.
76. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.010-.98.080 (1985).
77. The primary exclusive remedy provision of the Washington Workers'
Compensation Act provides:
The common law system governing the remedy of workers against employers
for injuries received in employment is inconsistent with modern industrial
conditions. In practice it proves to be economically unwise and unfair. Its
administration has produced the result that little of the cost of the employer
has reached the worker and that little only at large expense to the public.
The remedy of the worker has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries
in such works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and inevitable. The
welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more upon the
welfare of its wage worker. The state of Washington, therefore, exercising
herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises
are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for
workers, injured in their work, and their families and dependents is hereby
provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other
remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this
title; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such
personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such
causes are hereby abolished, except as in this title provided.
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1985) (emphasis added). The language of this provision
has remained virtually identical to the original provision enacted in 1911. 1911 WASH.
LAWS ch. 74, § 1. Only three changes have been made in the original 1911 exclusive
remedy provision: (1) the original words "workman" and "workmen" have been
changed to "worker" and "workers"; (2) the scope of the original provision has been
broadened from "hazardous work" and "extra hazardous work" to "employment" and
"work" generally; and (3) the original word "act" has been changed to "title." The
second exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act provides:
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employee's sole remedy is administrative compensation from
an Industrial Insurance fund maintained by mandatory
employer contributions."8 Therefore, the issue for nonsmokers
is whether they are barred by the exclusive remedy provisions
from suing their employer for harm caused by tobacco smoke
in the workplace.
In ascertaining whether the exclusive remedy provisions
apply to workplace tobacco smoke harms, two distinct issues
need to be considered. First, does the Workers' Compensation
Act cloak employers with absolute immunity from suit for any
harm to an employee occurring while in the course of employ-
ment, or rather, with qualified immunity which attaches
whenever the type of harm sustained is compensable under the
Workers' Compensation scheme? Second, assuming that
employer immunity attaches only when the Workers' Compen-
sation Act provides compensation for the type of harm sus-
tained, then are the harmful consequences of involuntary
workplace smoking compensable under the Act?
1. Absolute Immunity Versus Qualified Immunity
The immunity issue was recently considered in McCarthy
v. Department of Social and Health Services,79 where the
Washington Court of Appeals held in a case of first impression
that an employer had only qualified immunity 0 from suit by a
nonsmoking employee. Helen McCarthy is a former employee
of the Washington Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS). She claimed to be suffering from chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease with broncho-spasm and diminished pulmo-
nary function caused by exposure to tobacco smoke in the
DSHS workplace over a period of several years.81 In 1980,
McCarthy terminated her employment with DSHS.
She then submitted a claim for benefits under the Work-
Each worker injured in the course of his or her employment, or his or her
family or dependents in case of death of the worker, shall receive compensa-
tion in accordance with this chapter, and, except as in this title otherwise pro-
vided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever
against any person whomsoever ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.010 (1985) (emphasis added).
78. Id
79. 46 Wash. App. 125, 730 P.2d 681 (1986).
80. Qualified immunity is the general rule in the United States: "where the act is
inapplicable, the common-law and statutory remedies of the employee remain intact or
are not barred." See 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 919 (1958).
81. McCarthy, 46 Wash. App. at 126-27, 730 P.2d at 683.
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ers' Compensation Act. After her claim was rejected by the
Department of Labor and Industries, she appealed to the
Washington Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. Based
upon the testimony of two doctors who had examined Ms.
McCarthy, the Board concluded that exposure to cigarette
smoke in the workplace had proximately caused her disabling
lung disease. 2 Nevertheless, the Board decided that McCar-
thy's condition was not compensable under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act as either an injury or occupational disease. 3
This administrative decision was not appealed.
Unable to obtain Workers' Compensation benefits for her
condition, McCarthy commenced a civil action against DSHS in
the Thurston County Superior Court. She alleged in her com-
plaint that DSHS negligently failed to provide her with a safe
and healthful place of employment and an office environment
reasonably free of tobacco smoke. 4 The trial court dismissed
this action based upon the immunity conferred on employers
by the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the Workers'
Compensation Act exclusive remedy provisions bar private
causes of action only when the harm sustained is within the
coverage provisions of the Act. The court reasoned that
"[p]ersons who are injured by the negligent acts of others
should have a remedy against the tortfeasor unless their cause
of action is preempted by a statutory scheme, such as workers'
compensation. '8' The court concluded that it "would not be a
just result" to immunize a tortfeasor from suit when the harm
sustained is not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act
because the injured party would then be completely deprived
of a remedy.86
Early cases construing the Workers' Compensation Act
also held that employers have no immunity when the harm
sustained was not compensable under the Act. In Depre v.
82. Decision and Order, In re McCarthy, claim no. H-846420, at 7 (Wash. Bd.
Indus. Ins. App. July 26, 1983).
83. 1& at 2, 7.
84. McCarthy, 46 Wash. App. at 126, 730 P.2d at 683.
85. Id at 133, 730 P.2d at 686.
86. 1&
87. These early cases are important because they construed an exclusive remedy
provision which is virtually identical to the one currently codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.04.010 (1985). This case law is also important because it predates the 1937
amendments which expanded the Act's coverage to include occupational diseases. 1937
Wash. Laws ch. 212.
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Pacific Coast Forge Co.,8 a personal injury judgment in the
amount of $5,000 against the plaintiff's employer was affirmed.
The plaintiff-employee had acquired inflamed lungs due to
exposure over a two-year period to noxious gases in an inade-
quately ventilated workplace. The harm caused to the plain-
tiff's lungs made him susceptible to tuberculosis which he
eventually contracted.8 9 The court held that a common law or
factory act suit by the employee was not barred by the Work-
men's Compensation Act because the disease contracted was
not compensable under the Act.90
In Muir v. Kessinger,9 the court held that the "common-
law action may still be maintained and its remedy enforced in
all cases not specially covered by the Industrial Insurance Act
(even against the employer)." Other cases have stated or
relied on this proposition.92 The absence of employer immu-
nity in the foregoing cases is fully consistent with the policy
underpinnings of the Workers' Compensation Act.
From a public policy perspective, the applicability of an
exclusive remedy provision makes sense only when the type of
harm sustained is compensable under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act. This is so because the exclusive remedy concept is
inextricably bound to the worker's expectation of "sure and
certain relief" under the Act. The marriage of these two
notions forms the essence of the quid pro quo bargain inherent
in the workers' compensation scheme.93 The abolition of com-
88. 151 Wash. 430, 276 P. 89 (1929).
89. Id. at 431, 276 P. at 90.
90. Id. at 432, 276 P. at 90.
91. 35 F. Supp. 116, 117 (E.D. Wash. 1940) (citing Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499,
140 P. 681 (1914)).
92. See, e.g., Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 11, 84 P.2d 397, 400 (1938)
("by denial of compensation to the employee as being without the [Workers'
Compensation] act, the employer was subjected to the hazard of a suit at common law
....") See Pellerin v. Washington Veneer Co., 163 Wash. 555, 563, 2 P.2d 658, 661
(1931) (employer breached duty to provide safe workplace when employee harmed by
gas vapor poisoning; damages allowed because harm was not compensable under
Worker's Compensation Act). See also Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 170 Wash.
494, 497, 16 P.2d 824, 826 (1932) (negligence of an employer rendered it liable to an
employee poisoned by lead dust; damages allowed because no remedy existed under
the Workers' Compensation Act). Accord, Cagle v. Burns and Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d
911, 726 P.2d 434 (1986) (an employer had no immunity for a tortious act that was not
covered by the Workers' Compensation Act).
93. In the early case of Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256
(1916), the court discussed the historical considerations and policy underpinnings of
the quid pro quo compromise between employers and employees which formed the
foundation for the Workers' Compensation Act of 1911:
Our act came of a great compromise between employers and employed. Both
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mon law remedies without compensation for a particular type
of harm would constitute an abrogation of the fundamental
bargain.94
Therefore, from a policy standpoint the exclusive remedy
provisions should operate to remove court jurisdiction from all
phases of employer liability only to the extent that the type of
harm sustained is compensable under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.95 Because there probably is no set of facts under
which the harm from tobacco smoke can constitute either a
compensable injury or a compensable occupational disease, the
policy underpinnings of the Act should dictate that the exclu-
sive remedy provisions are inapplicable to this type of harm.
The statutory language supports this policy interpretation.
The statutory phrase "sure and certain relief for workers,
injured in their work.., is hereby provided regardless of ques-
tions of fault"9 6 is a clear explication of the benefits employees
are to receive pursuant to the quid pro quo compromise upon
which the Act is based. But the absence of any relief under
the Act for workers harmed by workplace tobacco smoke is
completely inconsistent with the statutory terms under which
the worker has surrendered all common law remedies against
the employer.
had suffered under the old system, the employers by heavy judgments of
which half was opposing lawyers' booty, the workmen through the old
defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The master
in exchange for limited liability was willing to pay on some claims in future
where in the past there had been no liability at all. The servant was willing
not only to give up trial by jury but to accept far less than he had often won in
court, provided he was sure to get the small sum without having to fight for it.
All agreed that the blood of the workman was a cost of production, that the
industry should bear the charge.
Id. at 590-91, 158 P. at 258.
94. This critical relationship between compensation and exclusive remedy has
been discussed by Professor Larson in his treatise:
If, as stated earlier, the exclusiveness defense is a part of the quid pro quo by
which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent
put in balance, it ought logically to follow that the employer should be spared
damage liability only when compensation liability has actually been provided
in its place, or, to state the matter from the employee's point of view, rights of
action for damages should not be deemed taken away except when something
of value has been put in their place.
2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.40 (1983).
95. Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 12-13, 84 P.2d 397, 400 (1938) (In
response to employer's assertion of immunity from suit when the harm was not
covered by the Act, the court stated that "[t]he law does not contemplate such an
anomaly").
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1985).
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Also, the primary exclusive remedy provision 97 uses the
word injuries or injured four times in setting forth the appli-
cation of the exclusiveness provision. Since injury is specifi-
cally defined in the Act, 98 this exclusive remedy provision is
limited by its own terms to the types of harm that constitute
an injury. The other exclusive remedy provision' 9 is likewise
limited by its own terms to circumstances where a worker has
been injured in the course of employment.
The case law echoes the statute by referring to the exclu-
sive remedy concept as arising in the injury context,"° thus
reinforcing the proposition that common law remedies have
not been abolished for non-injury harms. There is no doubt
that the exclusive remedy language is absolute and all-encom-
passing-but only within its scope of application to compensa-
ble harms.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the policy, statute, and
case law are all consistent with the concept that employer
immunity was never intended to be absolute simply because of
a person's status as an employee. Rather, the immunity is
qualified"0 and only applies to cases involving compensable
harms, i.e., when the quid pro quo compromise can be effectu-
ated for the type of harm sustained.
2. Workers' Compensation Coverage of
Tobacco Smoke Harms
In determining the scope of an employer's qualified inunu-
nity, it is essential to consider whether tobacco smoke harms
are compensable under the Act. If such harms are compensa-
ble, then employers are immune from common law suits by
employees.
97. 1&
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1985).
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.010 (1985) ("Each worker injured in the course of his
or her employment ... shall receive compensation in accordance with this chapter,
and.... such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever .... ").
100. See, e.g., Provost v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 103 Wash. 2d 750, 752,
696 P.2d 1238, 1239 (1985) ("By its express terms, the Washington workers'
compensation act, RCW Title 51, bars all independent causes of action against the
employer for damages arising out of unintentional injury to an employee.") (emphasis
added); Zenor v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 109 Wash. 471, 474, 186 P. 849, 850
(1920) ("the common law right of action for damages accruing from an injury received
by a workman in the course of his employment is abolished .. ") (emphasis added).
101. As further evidence that employers have only qualified immunity, see Reese
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wash. 2d 563, 731 P.2d 497 (1987) (no immunity from suit
for violating law against handicap discrimination).
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In Washington there are two ways that an employee can
qualify for a Workers' Compensation payment: (1) by sus-
taining an "injury" in the course of employment;'1 2 or (2) by
suffering disability from an "occupational disease."'103 Interest-
ingly, the exclusive remedy provisions' °4 refer only to injuries.
But the McCarthy court indicated that these provisions should
be impliedly read to encompass "occupational diseases" within
the ambit of their operation.
0 5
Assuming that the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act apply to both employment-related
"injuries" and to "occupational diseases," then the starting
point for analyzing the scope of these provisions is to consider
the definitions of "injury" and "occupational disease." For pur-
poses of the Workers' Compensation Act, "injury" is defined as
follows:
"Injury" means a sudden and tangible happening, of a trau-
matic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and
occurring from without, and such physical conditions as
result therefrom.1 0 6
"Occupational disease" is defined as follows:
"Occupational disease" means such disease or infection as
arises naturally and proximately out of employment under
the mandatory or elective adoption provisions of this title.1 0 7
An "injury" requires "some identifiable happening, event,
cause or occurrence capable of being fixed at some point in
time and connected with the employment."' '  While an
"injury" need not result from any "unusual exertion,"'0 9 "[t]he
cumulative effect of long continued routine and customary
duties upon a workman, regardless of the hours devoted
102. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.32.010-.015 (1985).
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.180 (1985).
104. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.010, .32.010 (1985).
105. McCarthy, 46 Wash. App. at 128 n.2, 730 P.2d at 684 n.2. Accord WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.16.040 (1985) ("The compensation and benefits provided for occupational
diseases shall be paid and in the same manner as compensation and benefits for
injuries under this title.").
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1985).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1985).
108. Spino v. Department of Labor and Indus., 1 Wash. App. 730, 733, 463 P.2d 256,
258 (1969).
109. Longview Fibre Co. v. Weimer, 95 Wash. 2d 583, 628 P.2d 456 (1981).
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thereto, is not a sudden and tangible happening."'10 "A pro-
tracted series of incidents" likewise does not satisfy the
requirement for a compensable injury."'
In contrast, an occupational disease "has a slow and insidi-
ous approach and in many cases does not manifest itself until
after the lapse of a considerable length of time.""' 2 The "natu-
rally and proximately" phrase in the occupational disease defi-
nition"13 has been construed to contain two separate elements
which must be satisfied before a condition can constitute an
occupational disease: the "proximately" element and the "nat-
urally" element. The "proximately" element is satisfied if the
disease-based disability was caused by the work or its attend-
ant conditions." 4
There are two formulations of the test for satisfying the
"naturally" element. In Division I, the Court of Appeals has
stated that to satisfy this element, there must be a "logical
relationship" between the disability and the work or its attend-
ant conditions." 5 The formulation in Division II is that the
"naturally" element is satisfied if the conditions producing the
disease are "peculiar to, or inherent in" the particular occupa-
tion. 1 6 However, under both formulations, the real inquiry
focuses on whether the disability was more likely in the claim-
ant's occupation than in other occupations or in nonemploy-
ment life." 7
110. Haerling v. Department of Labor and Indus., 49 Wash. 2d 403, 405, 301 P.2d
1078, 1080 (1956).
111. Cooper v. Department of Labor and Indus., 49 Wash. 2d 826, 828, 307 P.2d 272,
274 (1957).
112. Henson v. Department of Labor and Indus., 15 Wash. 2d 384, 391, 130 P.2d
885, 888 (1942).
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1985).
114. Dennis v. Department of Labor and Indus., 44 Wash. App. 423, 435, 722 P.2d
1317, 1324 (1986).
115. Id. at 433, 722 P.2d at 1322-23.
116. Department of Labor and Indus. v. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. 80, 87, 664 P.2d
1311, 1315 (1983).
117. These two formulations of the test for satisfying the "naturally" element
probably differ more in form than in substance. Division I in the Dennis case was
clearly disturbed by the "peculiar to" language adopted in Kinville. Dennis, 44 Wash.
App. at 431, 722 P.2d at 1322. While the "peculiar to" language sounds very restrictive,
Division II in McCarthy explained that "[a] disease need not be unique to be peculiar
to the employment, but the claimant must show that the job requirements exposed the
claimant to a greater risk of contracting the disease than would other types of
employment or nonemployment life." McCarthy, 46 Wash. App. at 130, 730 P.2d at 685.
Similarly, the Dennis court found the "logical relationship" test satisfied by the fact
that "a sheet metal worker is more likely to develop disabling osteoarthritis in his or
her wrists than somebody in a different profession or in nonworking life." Dennis, 44
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Based on the definitions of "injury" and "occupational dis-
ease," it is difficult to envision a factual scenario in which the
harm from involuntary smoking would be compensable under
the Act. The harm is not an injury because it is not a sudden
happening, nor is it traumatic. Instead, it manifests itself only
after a period of exposure. Tobacco smoke permeates the
indoor environment over time, often with concentrations that
increase as a function of time. The effects on a nonsmoker can
be hidden, and detection of the harm may be insidiously
delayed for a substantial period of time. The harm cannot be
attributed to any fixed point in time. Furthermore, it has been
held that the natural inhalation of air by a workman cannot by
itself be an "injury."' 8
Similarly, the harm from exposure to tobacco smoke can-
not constitute an "occupational disease." This is so because
tobacco smoke is undoubtedly present in virtually every type
of occupational workplace in our society. Involuntary smoking
disabilities have no logical relationship to the type of work-
place, are not peculiar to or inherent in any particular type of
occupation, and are not more likely to occur in particular occu-
pations. Involuntary smoking is also very pervasive in nonem-
ployment life.
The Washington Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals in
its In re McCarthy decision held that the harm from tobacco
smoke in the workplace was not compensable under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act as either an injury or an occupational
disease. i 9 This decision was not appealed.
In the subsequent McCarthy case, the Court of Appeals
briefly referred to the issue of whether the harmful conse-
Wash. App. at 437, 722 P.2d at 1325. Therefore, both Division I and Division II of the
Court of Appeals appear to be using the same basic definition of the "naturally"
element, i.e., development of the disabling condition must be more likely in the
claimant's occupation than in other occupations or in nonemployment life.
118. Flynn v. Department of Labor and Indus., 188 Wash. 346, 349, 62 P.2d 728, 729
(1936) (quick intake of breath caused a workman to swallow some tobacco, cough, and
strangle; he died from the resulting strain on his heart. The court held that the
inhalation of air "through natural passages and in a natural way cannot be a
'happening of a traumatic nature.' ") (quoting statutory definition of injury).
119. Decision and Order, In re McCarthy, claim no. H-846420 (Wash. Bd. Indus.
Ins. App. July 26, 1983) (Board determined that the claimant's disabling lung disease
was proximately caused by exposure to tobacco smoke in her place of employment, but
not a compensable injury because it was not sustained at a "definite time and place."
Her harm was not a compensable occupational disease because the cigarette smoke in
her workplace was not "in excess of that found in other types of employment or in
many non-employment situations.").
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quences of involuntary workplace smoking are covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act. The court did not decide this
issue, but left it for determination by the trial court on
remand. However, the court strongly implied that this type of
harm was not compensable under the Act.120  The court's
remand of the coverage issue was unnecessary since the
employer should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the
unappealed Board decision denying coverage under the Act. 12 '
It is unlikely that any kind of harm caused by involuntary
workplace smoking will be compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act. Therefore, employers appear to have no
immunity from suit for such harms.
0
C. Employer Immunity From Actions to Enjoin
Smoking in the Workplace
In an action by an employee to enjoin smoking in a partic-
ular workplace, the employer may move to dismiss the action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 22
Just as in an action at law for damages, the employer would be
claiming immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act.
However, regardless of whether employer immunity might
exist in an action at law for damages, it seems unlikely that
the courts would extend such immunity to equitable actions
against an employer.
Apparently, no Washington court has directly addressed
the effect of the Act's exclusive remedy provisions on equitable
120. The court stated:
After reviewing the complaint ourselves, we believe that McCarthy might be
able to produce competent medical evidence that her disease was not within
the coverage of the act. Indeed, the rather detailed and specific factual
averments in McCarthy's complaint appear to be consistent with her
allegation that DSHS was negligent and that the disease she contracted
because of such negligence was not peculiar to or inherent in her occupation
at DSHS.
McCarthy, 46 Wash. App. at 132-33, 730 P.2d at 686.
121. In Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 60 Wash. 2d 484, 374 P.2d 675 (1962), the
court had in an earlier departmental opinion sua sponte dismissed an employee's
negligence action against her employer on the ground that the trial court was without
jurisdiction because the matter came within the coverage of the workmen's
compensation statute. Subsequently, the en banc court reinstated the common law
action because the Department of Labor and Industries had rejected the plaintiff's
claim as not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. The court reasoned that the
unappealed claim rejection by the Department of Labor and Industries was res
judicata against the employer's assertion of immunity in the subsequent common law
action. Id. at 485, 374 P.2d at 676.
122. SUPER. CT. CIVIL R. 12(b)(6).
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remedies. But the cases construing the Act's exclusive remedy
provisions invariably refer only to abolition of the "common
law right of action for damages"' 23 or to the removal of juris-
diction over injuries "from the law courts.' 1 24
In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.,125 the court
construed the New Jersey Workers' Compensation exclusive
remedy provision, which eliminated a worker's "rights to any
other method, form or amount of compensation."' 26 The court
held that this provision barred the common-law action in tort
for damages resulting from work-related injuries but did not
bar equitable remedies.'27
Assuming arguendo that there is a factual scenario under
which a nonsmoker's common law damage action is barred by
the Washington's Worker's Compensation Act, equitable relief
should still be available because the exclusive remedy provi-
sions apply by their terms only to common law actions. There
is no mention of equity or equitable actions in either provision.
The first four sentences of the primary exclusive remedy
provision discuss the historical problems with the "common
law system governing the remedy of workers against employ-
ers." 28 The reference only to the common law system logi-
cally should mean that the equity system is not included in the
exclusive remedy provision.
The last sentence of the provision states that the Workers'
Compensation Act remedy will be "to the exclusion of every
other remedy, proceeding or compensation.' ' 29 In ascertaining
the intended meaning of the general terms remedy and pro-
ceeding, the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory construction
is appropriately used. Under this doctrine, specific terms
restrict the meaning of general terms when both are used in a
sequence. 130 Application of this rule to the sequence "remedy,
123. See, e.g., Zenor v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 109 Wash. 471, 474, 186 P.
849, 850 (1920).
124. See, e.g., Ross v. Erickson Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 634, 640, 155 P. 153, 156 (1916).
125. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
126. Id. at 525, 368 A.2d at 412.
127. Id.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1985) (emphasis added).
129. Md
130. In Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wash. 2d 106, 676 P.2d 466 (1984),
the court set forth the following rule:
The ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in
connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the
extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the
1987] 613
614 University of Puget Sound Law Review
proceeding or compensation" limits the interpretation of rem-
edy and proceeding to compensation type of remedies or pro-
ceedings, i.e., actions at common law.'
The other exclusive remedy provision states that the
worker will receive "compensation" and that "such payment
shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever." '132
Once again, no reference is made to excluding equitable reme-
dies. The receipt of compensation and payment in lieu of
other rights of action seems to contemplate only a relinquish-
ment of common law damage remedies in return for equivalent
money damages under the Act - the quid pro quo inherent in
the scheme of workers' compensation.
Furthermore, the preamble to the original Workers' Com-
pensation Act states in relevant part: "An Act relating to the
compensation of injured workmen ... abolishing the doctrine
of negligence as a ground for recovery of damages against
employers." '13 3 This language is a clear indication that the 1911
Legislature, which drafted the exclusive remedy provision still
in effect today, intended to supplant only the legal system of
recovering damages. Again, no mention is made of the equita-
ble system of remedies, so they must remain intact and are not
barred.
This interpretation is fully consistent with the quid pro
quo bargain policy at the heart of the Act: Workers gave up
potentially larger but uncertain common law damage remedies
in return for smaller but certain statutory damage remedies.
The relinquishment of equitable remedies would have no logi-
cal relationship to the fundamental quid pro quo bargain.
Even if the Legislature attempted to confer absolute
immunity from suit on employers, it probably is without con-
stitutional authority to abolish the jurisdiction of courts to
exercise their "inherent equitable powers" to grant injunc-
tions.13 4 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that any limitation on
specific terms. In short, specific terms modify or restrict the application of
general terms where both are used in sequence.
Id at 111, 676 P.2d at 469.
131. This interpretation is buttressed by the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed. Bunce Rental, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co.,
42 Wash. App. 644, 713 P.2d 128 (1986). Thus, a more narrow interpretation of remedy
and proceeding is also appropriate because the statute is supplanting the common law
rights of action.
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.010 (1985) (emphasis added).
133. 1911 Wash. Laws ch. 74 (emphasis added).
134. In O'Brien v. Johnson, 32 Wash. 2d 404, 202 P.2d 248 (1949), the court held
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the discretionary exercise of those powers would be recognized
by the courts in the absence of an explicit and unambiguous
statutory provision limiting equitable remedies.
Statutory construction, policy, and case law all support the
proposition that the exclusive remedy provisions apply only to
tort actions at law for damages. Therefore, the Workers' Com-
pensation Act should not bar actions in equity to enjoin smok-
ing the workplace.
IV. LAWS PROTECTING HANDICAPPED PERSONS
Federal and state statutes require that certain employers
accommodate "handicapped persons." If a sensitive nonsmok-
ing employee can qualify as a "handicapped person," he or she
may be able to invoke the statute to obtain a smoke-free
workplace.
A. Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
One of the most promising legal theories for protecting
nonsmoking workers is based upon the Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.' Under that law, a "qualified handicapped indi-
vidual" is entitled to "reasonable accommodation" for his or
her handicap.136 Smoke-sensitive individuals have had some
success in obtaining "handicapped" status under the Act. 137
However, the statutory scheme only protects students and
employees of federal grant recipients, employees of federal
contractors, and employees of the federal government. When
the statute does apply, a prohibition on smoking in the individ-
ual's work or study area is arguably the appropriate "reason-
able accommodation" mandated by the Act.
The statutory definition of "handicapped individual" is
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment."' 38 A more detailed
definition of "handicapped individual" has been established in
that notwithstanding a statute removing court jurisdiction to grant injunctions
restraining tax collections, the courts retain all their inherent equitable powers. See
also Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796, 557 P.2d 342 (1976) (court is at liberty to set
the boundaries on the exercise of its inherent equitable powers).
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794a (1982).
136. See infra notes 146-80 and accompanying text.
137. 1&
138. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (7)(B) (1982).
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regulations promulgated by various federal agencies. 3 9 For
example, regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) 4 ° state that a qualifying
"physical or mental impairment" includes "any physiological
disorder or condition... affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; .. . special sense organs; respira-
tory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;... digestive."''
The HHS regulations also provide that "major life activities"
include "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working."' 4 2
The Rehabilitation Act's scope of coverage is set forth in
three main provisions: (1) Section 501143 makes the Act appli-
cable to each department, agency, and instrumentality in the
Executive Branch of the United States Government; (2) Sec-
tion 503'14 makes the Act applicable to government contractors
where the contract value exceeds $2,500; and (3) Section 504141
makes the Act applicable to federal grant recipients and to
activities of the federal government itself.
1. Section 501
Under Section 501, a federal agency must "make reason-
able accommodation to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of a qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless
the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. 
' 146
The United States Office of Personnel Management does rec-
ognize that a smoke-sensitive federal employee with a disabil-
ity such asthma, emphysema, or severe bronchitis can qualify
as a handicapped individual entitled under Section 501 to "rea-
sonable accommodation.'
' 47
139. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1986) (Dep't of Health and Human Services); 29
C.F.R. § 1613.702 (1986) (Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n); 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741.2 (1986) (Dep't of Labor, Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs); 32 C.F.R.
§ 56.3(c) (1986) (Dep't of Defense)
140. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1986).
141. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(i).
142. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-.709 (1986) (governing
the practices of federal agencies in dealing with handicapped employees).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982). See also 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to .54 (1986).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1986).
147. Letter from Robert L. Martinez, Assistant Director for Affirmative
Employment Programs, U.S. Office of Personnel Management to Raymond L. Paolella
(March 18, 1986) ("If a person has a disability such as: asthma, emphysema, or severe
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The Section 501 regulations provide for the filing of an
administrative complaint by aggrieved federal employees to
obtain relief based upon asserted status as a handicapped indi-
vidual.148 These administrative remedies must be exhausted
prior to filing a court action against the government. 149 Final
administrative decisions are then subject to judicial review in a
de novo action brought under Section 501.150
In Pletten v. Department of the Army,'' the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) determined
that a smoke-sensitive employee with chronic asthma was a
"handicapped individual" entitled to "reasonable accommoda-
tion" pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. In reviewing a prior
decision in the same case by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB),5 2 the EEOC construed its regulations 53 as
mandating accommodations for a smoke-sensitive handicapped
employee unless the agency could prove that such accommo-
dating actions would be an undue hardship on the agency.'5
The case was then referred back to the MSPB because the
Army had not carried its substantial burden of proving undue
hardship.
Upon reconsideration, the MSPB reaffirmed that the
employee was a handicapped person but decided that the only
effective accommodation of this handicap would be a complete
ban on smoking throughout the agency's 5,000 employee facil-
ity.155 This was so because the smoke-sensitive employee was
required as part of his job to regularly move around the entire
facility. The Board concluded that such a total ban on smoking
was not a reasonable accommodation because it would be diffi-
bronchitis, and the disability is agitated by tobacco smoke where by the individual
cannot perform the duties of the position, the individual may be considered by the
agency for reasonable accommodation."). [Letter on file at University of Puget Sound
Law Review office.]
148. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.708-.709 (1986). These regulations require each agency of
the federal government to process complaints of discrimination based on handicap in
accordance with detailed procedures set forth in id. §§ 1613.213-.283 and in id.
§§ 1613.601-.643.
149. McGuinness v. United States Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1984). A
private right of action against the United States Government under § 501 is expressly
provided for by 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1982).
150. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
151. No. 03810087 (Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n April 8, 1983).
152. Pletten v. Department of the Army, 6 M.S.P.B. 626 (1981).
153. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-.709 (1986).
154. Pletten, EEOC No. 03810087 at 5.
155. Pletten v. Department of Army, 23 M.S.P.R. 682 (1984).
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cult to enforce, might violate the collective bargaining agree-




Under Section 503, government contractors and subcon-
tractors "must make a reasonable accommodation to the physi-
cal and mental limitations of an employee or applicant unless
the contractor can demonstrate that such an accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the con-
tractor's business."1 7 Thus, a contractor would be required to
reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee or applicant
who is unable to work in a smoke-filled environment.
Unfortunately, however, handicapped persons have no pri-
vate right of action to enforce Section 503.158 They are instead
relegated to filing an administrative complaint against the con-
tractor with the Department of Labor.
159
3. Section 504
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act1 60 is probably the
most significant section of the Act for nonsmokers because it
applies to any recipient of federal funds regardless of the dol-
lar amount received. Even indirect federal funding triggers
the application of Section 504.161 Among others, this section
applies to schools, universities, medical institutions, and most
entities of state and local government. In addition, this section
provides an overlapping basis with Section 501 for a private
right of action against the federal government by individuals
156. Id.
157. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1986).
158. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 881
(1982).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1982). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28 (1986).
160. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
161. Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984). However, § 504
applies only to the specific "program or activity" receiving funds. Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 636 (1984).
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claiming "handicapped" status. 6 2
Like Sections 501 and 503, Section 504 imposes a duty of
reasonable accommodation on those entities to which it
applies. 163 A typical set of regulations implementing Section
504 is that promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). 64 The HHS regulations require a fed-
eral fund recipient to "make reasonable accommodation to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its program.' 1 65 A "qualified
handicapped person" is defined, in the employment context, as
"a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the job.P'16
Two cases have considered whether a nonsmoker can qual-
ify as a handicapped person under Section 504. In Vickers v.
Veterans Administration,'16 the court held that a smoke-sensi-
tive employee of the Veterans Administration (VA) was a
"handicapped person" within the contemplation of Section
504.168 The court found that plaintiff was "unusually sensitive
to tobacco smoke" and that this hypersensitivity did in fact
limit a major life activity- plaintiff's capacity to work in an
environment not completely smoke free. 6 9
However, the court stated that it was unable to find that
plaintiff had been solely by reason of his handicap, excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of any program or
activity conducted by the VA. The court also considered
whether plaintiff had been discriminated against because of
the failure of the VA to make reasonable accommodation to his
physical handicap.
162. See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
(court relied on § 504 rather than § 501 in action against federal agency).
163. Conceptually, § 504 differs from § 503 in that § 504 confers a right on
handicapped persons not to be subjected to discrimination, whereas § 503 by its terms
merely requires affirmative action covenants to be placed in government contracts.
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980).
However, implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor have
imposed the same basic reasonable accommodation duty on federal contractors as is
imposed under § 504 on federal grant recipients. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1986).
164. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1986).
165. Id. § 8 4.12(a).
166. Id. § 84.3(k).
167. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
168. Id. at 86.
169. Id. at 87.
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In an effort to accommodate plaintiff's handicap, the VA
had obtained a voluntary agreement from all of the employees
in plaintiff's work area and in an adjacent work area not to
smoke in either area. Smoking employees were given permis-
sion by the supervisor to smoke in an office which was physi-
cally separate from the common work area. The court found
that this action alone had "significantly reduced the presence
of tobacco smoke in plaintiff's work space."'170 Furthermore,
plaintiff's supervisor had two ceiling vents installed to with-
draw from the room any drifting tobacco smoke from other
areas. Finally, the supervisor offered to construct a floor to
ceiling enclosure around plaintiff's desk which would have a
door.
17 '
The court concluded that the VA had made a reasonable
effort to accommodate plaintiff's handicap while at the same
time accommodating the desires of smokers. It denied the
plaintiff damages and injunctive relief.
In Gasp v. Mecklenberg County,172 an unincorporated asso-
ciation brought an action against the county on behalf of a
class of all persons harmed by tobacco smoke present in public
facilities. The organization sought handicapped status for the
entire class under both the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and a North Carolina statute that protected handicapped
persons.
173
In denying handicapped status to the class, the court stated
that the North Carolina Legislature clearly did not intend to
grant handicapped status to a broad class of persons with "any
pulmonary problem however minor.' 1 74 But the court also
specifically reserved judgment on whether a narrower class of
smoke-sensitive persons could claim handicapped status. The
Rehabilitation Act claim was rejected for the same reasons.
The precedential value of this case is probably limited to its
particular factual context; a narrower and more specific class
of persons may have been successful in obtaining handicapped
status.
170. Id. at 88.
171. Id.
172. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-1 to -23 (1982).
174. Gasp, 256 S.E.2d at 479.
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4. General Considerations
The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act seem
to provide ample grounds for classifying a smoke-sensitive
worker as a "qualified handicapped person." For example, an
individual with asthma who has distressing allergic reactions to
tobacco smoke has a respiratory condition that substantially
limits that person's ability to breathe and work in a smoke-fil-
led environment. If this individual can perform the job func-
tions in a smoke-free work environment, then he or she would
meet the definition of a "qualified handicapped person."
Once handicapped status is established, the employer has
an affirmative duty to accommodate the smoke-sensitive
employee.175 But the Pletten and Vickers cases demonstrate
that obtaining effective smoking restrictions under the Reha-
bilitation Act will often be more difficult than clearing the ini-
tial hurdle of achieving "handicapped" status.
Determining what constitutes a reasonable accommoda-
tion... necessarily involves a case-by-case evaluation. Only
accommodations which result in "undue hardship" to the
employer are outside the scope of the reasonable accommoda-
tion duty.'77 This means that an employer must provide a
smoke-sensitive handicapped employee with an environment in
which he or she can work, except when it will create an"undue hardship."
Regulations provide several factors to be considered in
determining whether a suggested accommodation would
impose an undue hardship.178 These factors suggest a cost-ben-
efit balancing approach to determining the limits of reasonable
accommodation. Significantly, the employer has the burden of
proving that a suggested accommodation would cause undue
175. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1986); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d)
(1986). See also U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK OF REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION (1980).
176. Reasonable accommodation may include "[m]aking facilities ... usable by
handicapped persons, . . . job restructuring" and "acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices." 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1986).
177. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1986); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d)
(1986).
178. The undue hardship factors include: "(1) [t]he overall size of the recipient's
program with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size
of budget; (2) [t]he type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and
structure of the recipient's workforce; and (3) [t]he nature and cost of the
accommodation needed." 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1986).
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hardship. 79
For many employers, an objective cost-benefit analysis will
likely show that substantial restrictions on workplace smoking
are not an undue hardship, but rather a benefit to both the
employer and employees. 80 Thus, employer prohibitions on
workplace smoking appear to be well within the limits placed
on reasonable accommodation by the concept of "undue
hardship."
The smoke-sensitive employee's right to reasonable accom-
modation in the workplace can be vindicated by a court action
under either Section 501 or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The employee can seek injunctive relief under the Act,
but there is an unresolved split of authority as to whether
money damages may be recovered.' 8 ' Significantly, the award
of attorney's fees is authorized by the Act.8 2 Also, grant recip-
ients must comply with the Act as a condition for future
receipt of federal funds.18 3 These available remedies coupled
with the substantive rights established by the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 make that Act a potentially powerful source of
legal rights for nonsmokers who can qualify as "handicapped
individuals."
B. Washington Law Against Handicap Discrimination
All employers in the State of Washington are required by
the Law Against Discrimination'" to reasonably accommodate
handicapped employees.' 8 5 Because of the close similarities
between this Washington statute and the federal Rehabilita-
179. Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983). Although Treadwell
discussed the burden of persuasion only with respect to demonstrating undue hardship
under the § 501 regulations, the same burden allocation should apply to actions
brought under § 504 because the respective regulations implementing § 501 and § 504
contain virtually identical language in setting forth the undue hardship requirement.
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1986) with 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986).
180. The imposition of smoking restrictions should normally result in reduced
employer operating costs while creating a more healthy and productive workplace. See
supra note 38.
181. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See, e.g., Kling v.
County of Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (money damages are recoverable);
Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children, 599 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Mo. 1984) (damages for mental distress not allowed); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep.
School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (money damages not recoverable).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982).
183. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.5(a) (1986).
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1985).
185. Dean v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 104 Wash. 2d 627, 708 P.2d 393
(1985).
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tion Act of 1973, interpretations of the federal act are consid-
ered instructive with regard to interpreting the Washington
statute. 8
Thus, a large part of the previous discussion on the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973187 is relevant to protecting "handi-
capped" nonsmokers in Washington who are unable to claim
protection under the federal act. Unlike the Rehabilition Act,
the Washington Law Against Discrimination""' clearly pro-
vides for a full panoply of remedies: injunctive relief; attor-
ney's fees; special damages; and general damages for physical,
emotional, and mental suffering. 8 9
The Washington definition of "handicapped person," as set
forth in regulation, is a person with a "sensory, mental, or
physical condition" which is abnormal.' 9° Under this defini-
tion, a nonsmoker who is unusually sensitive or allergic to
tobacco smoke would seem to qualify as a handicapped person.
Some of the other definitional language is quite similar to that
found in the federal statute and implementing regulations. 191
Also, a statutory section expressly provides that the Washing-
ton statute should be liberally construed.'92
Therefore, a nonsmoking employee in Washington may be
able to obtain some relief under state law based upon his or
her status as a handicapped person.
V. OTHER TORT THEORIES
Although notable success has not yet been achieved, sev-
eral other tort theories may be available to some nonsmokers
in the future. 93 The torts of outrage, battery, and nuisance
186. Id
187. See supra notes 135-83 and accompanying text.
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(2) (1985).
189. Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 693 P.2d 708 (1985).
190. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 162-22-040 (1986).
191. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 162-22-040(1)(b) (1986) with 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B) (1982) (both provisions contain three alternative tests for determining
handicapped status which are very similar, although the Washington definition may be
broader because it is not restricted to impairments which substantially limit major life
activities).
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (1985).
193. Washington has adopted sections 519 and 520 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS dealing with strict liability. Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567
P.2d 218 (1977). Section 519 of the RESTATEMENT provides that one who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to another person
regardless of the amount of care exercised to prevent such harm. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). However, the current state of the law makes it
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could become viable theories if existing tort doctrine is
extended in response to the growing awareness of the harm
from involuntary smoking.
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts9 4 pro-
vides that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm."'95 But under the existing state of law, a smoker's or
employer's conduct will rarely reach the high magnitude of
outrage necessary to recover under this theory.196
A cause of action in battery could theoretically lie for the
harmful or offensive contact resulting from involuntary expo-
sure to tobacco smoke. An act constitutes tortious battery if
done with the knowledge that a harmful or offensive contact'9
is substantially certain to be produced. 9" But the courts have
not yet recognized tobacco smoke exposure as constituting
such a harmful or offensive contact. 99
improbable that a court would confer "abnormally dangerous" status on an employer
who permitted its employees to smoke in the workplace.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
195. This provision has been adopted in Washington. Grimsby v. Samson, 85
Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
196. Comment d to § 46 states that liability exists "only where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comment d (1965). Cf.
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 183 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (California Court
of Appeal held that a former employee who was allegedly terminated in retaliation for
his complaining about workplace smoking could bring such an action against his
former employer).
197. Because tobacco smoke contains particulate matter which can physically
harm a human being, exposure to smoke could be viewed as representing a harmful or
offensive contact. In Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash. 2d
677, 695, 709 P.2d 782, 792 (1985), the Washington Supreme Court held that an
"intentional deposit of microscopic particulates, undetectable by the human senses,
gives rise to a cause of action for trespass as well as a claim of nuisance." By analogy,
this holding has implications for the intentional tort of battery. Since the court has
recognized that one type of intentional tort can be based upon the harm caused by
microscopic particulates, then there should be no conceptual impediment to
microscopic tobacco smoke particulates satisfying the harmful or offensive contact
element of battery.
198. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
199. Failure to offer evidence of a physical injury or illness was the basis for
dismissal of a tobacco smoke battery action in McCracken v. Sloan, 40 N.C. App. 214,
252 S.E.2d 250 (1979). The McCracken court also stated that "[c]onsent is assumed to
all those ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the
common intercourse of life" and that tobacco smoke fell within this area of assumed
consent. Id. at 216, 252 S.E.2d at 252. The McCracken court's poorly reasoned
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In Washington, a nuisance is defined as "whatever is inju-
rious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses" and may
be "the subject of an action for damages and other and further
relief."200 Involuntary smoking clearly can be injurious to
health and offensive to the senses. But whether the courts
would extend nuisance doctrine to cover tobacco smoke is sim-
ply unknown. Rigid adherence to traditional private nuisance
doctrine20 ' would limit its application to cases where one's
right to enjoyment of property has been infringed.0 2
Finally, the Washington State Environmental Policy Act
(SEPA) provides that "each person has a fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment."2 3 The SEPA
term "environment" has been defined very broadly" and
appears to include indoor airspaces occupied by nonsmokers.
Several commentators have suggested that SEPA may have
created a new tort cause of action to vindicate the statutorily
conferred fundamental right to a healthful environment.20 5
Although this interpretation has not yet been adopted by the
courts, 20 6 it may present an opportunity for the future develop-
ment of tort law doctrine pertaining to unhealthful indoor
environments.20 7
determination that tobacco smoke is reasonably necessary to life should be rejected in
Washington since significant legal restrictions on smoking have been adopted by both
state and local legislative bodies. Such restrictions on smoking surely reflect a
legislative judgment that involuntary smoking is not reasonably necessary to life.
200. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.010 (1985).
201. Nuisance requires a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use
and enjoyment of property. Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 104
Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985).
202. But see Stockler v. City of Pontiac, No. 75-131479 (Cir. Ct. Oakland County,
Mich. filed Dec. 17, 1975), where the court found that smoking in a stadium constituted
a public nuisance. The court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the city to abate the
nuisance by prohibiting smoking and the sale of cigarettes within the facility.
Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The Majestic Vice
Versus The Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 469 (1980).
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1985).
204. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 197-11-444 (1986).
205. Rodgers, The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33,
64-65 (1984); Roe & Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 and its 1973
Amendments, 49 WASH. L. REV. 509, 528 n.90 (1974); Note, Miotke v. City of Spokane:
Nuisance or Inverse Condemnation - Theories for Government Environmental
Liability, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 539, 557-560 (1986).
206. In Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 333, 678 P.2d 803, 817 (1984),
the Washington Supreme Court declined to recognize a SEPA-based tort but implied
that it might recognize such a cause of action under appropriate circumstances.
207. Based upon the premise that a smoke-filled room is an unhealthful
environment, SEPA could theoretically be used by the courts as the basis for an
expanded application of traditional common law doctrine to protect nonsmokers. Such
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At present, the foregoing tort theories are unlikely to pro-
vide nonsmokers with a useful remedy. But they may be help-
ful in the future if courts decide to expand the current scope of
tort doctrine to protect nonsmokers.
VI. OTHER FEDERAL LAW
A. Federal Employee Disability Retirement
A smoke-sensitive employee of the federal government
may be entitled to a disability retirement annuity if the gov-
ernment refuses to provide a work environment in which the
employee can function. In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection
Board,20 8 a smoke-sensitive employee had asthmatic bronchitis
with hyper-irritable airways. After working for the govern-
ment for twelve years, she was transferred to a new work area
where many people smoked. She was unable to function in the
smoke-filled workplace and so her doctor advised her to take a
leave of absence.2 °9
She then applied for disability retirement benefits. This
application was rejected even though the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board (MSPB) recognized that Parodi "might reason-
ably be concerned with the probable risk to her future health
from working in an environment where exposure to cigarette
smoke presents a hazard to all employees, and particularly to
herself because of her peculiar physical sensitivity. '21
The statute then in effect provided that an employee was
entitled to a disability retirement annuity21" if unable to per-
form "useful and efficient service in the grade or class of posi-
tion last occupied by the employee . . . because of disease or
injury. '2 1 2 The court held that a person with an "environmen-
tal limitation" can qualify for a disability retirement.2 1 3 The
court then ordered the government to grant Ms. Parodi disabil-
ity retirement benefits unless it offered her a safe work envi-
an expansive interpretation could find support from statutory pronouncements that
SEPA policies overlay all Washington laws as well as the activities of all branches of
government. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.030(1), .060 (1985). See R. SETTLE, THE
WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS § 1
at 4 (1987) ("SEPA's statutory language is unusually broad, 'almost constitutional.' ").
208. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).
209. Id. at 733.
210. Id.
211. 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (Supp. III 1979).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6) (1976).
213. Parodi, 690 F.2d at 738.
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ronment within 60 days.214 The government eventually settled
with Ms. Parodi by paying her $50,000 and granting her a civil
service disability annuity.215
The Parodi case is important for several reasons. First, a
federal appeals court has clearly recognized that tobacco
smoke in the workplace can prevent an otherwise normal and
productive employee from performing his or her job. Second,
such an employee in effect becomes disabled and may be enti-
tled to disability benefits.
Finally, the refusal of an employer to restrict smoking in
the workplace can be very costly to the employer if an
employee is eventually granted a disability pension award
because of the tobacco smoke.
B. Regulations Restricting Smoking in Federal Buildings
The General Services Administration (GSA) has promul-
gated regulations to control smoking in U.S. Government
buildings and facilities.2 1 6 An amended version of these regula-
tions became effective on February 6, 1987.217 The regulations
prohibit all smoking in auditoriums, classrooms, conference
rooms, elevators, medical care facilities, libraries, and hazard-
ous areas.218 Smoking is also prohibited in corridors, lobbies,
restrooms, and stairways, except that agencies may designate
these areas as smoking areas "when it is not possible to desig-
nate a sufficient number of other smoking areas. ''219
In a major shift in policy, the recently revised regulations
prohibit smoking in most general office space.22° Office space
may be designated as a smoking area only if it is "configured so
as to limit the involuntary exposure of non-smokers to second-
hand smoke to a minimum; e.g., the office space involved must
be large enough and sufficiently ventilated to provide separate
smoking and non-smoking sections which protect the non-
214. Id. at 740.
215. Settlement Agreement, Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731
(9th Cir. 1982).
216. 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10 (1986).
217. 51 Fed. Reg. 44,258 (1986) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10).
218. Id. (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10(b)).
219. Id. (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10(b)(4), .109-10(c)(2)(iv)).
220. Id. (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10(b)(1)). These workplace
smoking restrictions are unprecedented in terms of the number of persons affected.
The restrictions apply to 7,500 federal buildings and almost the entire civilian
Government workforce of 2.3 million people. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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smokers against involuntary exposure to smoke. '221
GSA's stated intent in issuing the revised regulations "is to
provide a reasonably smoke-free environment for those work-
ing and visiting GSA-controlled buildings. '222 In a significant
policy statement, the regulations provide that "[i]n recognition
of the increased health hazards of passive smoke on the non-
smoker, smoking is to be held to an absolute minimum in areas
where there are non-smokers. '2
23
The new GSA regulations are similar to a smoking policy
that has been effective for several years at the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS directives guarantee
nonsmokers "working environments which are reasonably free
of contaminants by smoke."' 2 ' These directives have been
invoked to prohibit smoking on the entire fifth floor work area
of a large federal office building.225
Existing government regulations represent a major step in
the direction of a smoke-free federal workplace. In the near
future, there is a distinct possibility that Congress may require
even greater restrictions on smoking in federal facilities.2 6
Thus, the immediate future looks promising for nonsmoking
federal employees.
VII. OTHER WASHINGTON LAW
A. Washington Clean Indoor Air Act
The Washington Clean Indoor Air Act 22 7 became effective
on July 28, 1985. This Act represents an important first step
toward full statutory protection of nonsmokers in Washington.
Fundamentally, the Act reverses the long-established
social presumption about public smoking. The new statutory
presumption established by the Act is that smoking in "public
places" is generally prohibited.228 Since the Act's effective
221. Id. (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10(b)(1), .109-10(c)(2)(iii)).
222. 51 Fed. Reg. 18,805 (1986).
223. 51 Fed. Reg. 44,258 (1986) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.109-10(a)(1)).
224. Goodman v. Social Sec. Admin., FMCS No. 81K-26042, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1982)
(Berkeley, Arb.).
225. Id at 24.
226. Bills were recently introduced in both houses of Congress that would
drastically curtail workplace smoking in federal facilities. S. 1937, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); H.R. 4546, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). S. 1937 was reported out of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee on December 12, 1985.
227. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.160.010-.900 (1985).
228. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.030 (1985).
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date, smoking is permitted only in designated smoking areas. 2 2 9
A $100 civil fine may be imposed for violating the Act.230
"Public Place" is given a broad non-exclusive definition in
the Act.23 1 The Act probably reaches every indoor location in
the State of Washington except for private residences, private
enclosed workplaces, federal government facilities, and private
facilities to the extent that they are closed to the public. Some
public places must be totally smoke-free such as elevators,
retail stores, financial institutions, museums, and classrooms.2 2
Finally, the Act requires the posting of signs "at each building
entrance" of each "public place" in the State of Washington. 3
The signs must indicate whether smoking is permitted or
prohibited.2 4
A serious shortcoming of the Washington Clean Indoor
Air Act is its failure to regulate smoking in the private work-
place. The Act currently protects only the few workers who
work in a "public place" in which smoking is prohibited.
Recent attempts in the Legislature to comprehensively regu-
late private workplace smoking have so far been unable to
overcome powerful opposition by the tobacco lobby.2 1
B. Ordinances Restricting Smoking
Ordinances restricting smoking have been adopted in the
City of Seattle, King County, and Pierce County. The Seattle
ordinance governing "NO SMOKING AREAS ' 236 generally
overlaps with provisions of the Washington Clean Indoor Air
Act 237 by prohibiting smoking in public places, except in desig-
229. Id.
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.070 (1985).
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.020(2) (1985) (" 'Public place' means that portion of
any building or vehicle used by and open to the public, regardless of whether the
building or vehicle is owned in whole or in part by private persons or entities, the state
of Washington, or other public entity, and regardless of whether a fee is charged for
admission.").
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.040 (1985).
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.050 (1985).
234. Id Local fire departments and fire districts are responsible for enforcement
of the sign posting requirements. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.070(3) (1985).
235. On February 11, 1987, a bill was approved by the Washington House of
Representatives that would have conferred on employees in both the public and
private sectors the right to a smoke-free workplace. As a result of successful tobacco
lobbying efforts, however, the Workplace Clean Air Act died in Senator Frank
Warnke's Commerce and Labor Committee without being voted on. S.H.B. 13, 50th
Leg., 1987 Reg. Sess.
236. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 10.64.010-.060 (1986).
237. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.160.010-.900 (1985).
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nated smoking areas,23 and by requiring the occupants of pub-
lic places to post signs prohibiting smoking.23 9 Unlike the
state statute, however, the Seattle ordinance does not have any
penalty for persons who smoke in a no smoking area.
Another Seattle ordinance provides that all facilities
owned, leased, or rented by the City (including workplaces)
will be completely smoke-free by January, 1988.240 Similarly, a
King County ordinance which becomes effective July 1, 1987
prohibits smoking in all enclosed work areas and common area
of facilities owned, leased, or rented by King County.24'
The Pierce County ordinance21 is by far the strongest,
most progressive legislation of its kind in Washington. Its pro-
visions also overlap with the Clean Indoor Air Act, but in addi-
tion it contains a stringent provision on workplace smoking.
This workplace provision 243 requires that the preferences of
nonsmoking employees shall prevail in all private workplaces.
An employer is required to prohibit smoking in the workplace
if any nonsmoker requests such an action.2 " Noncompliance
with this workplace provision makes the employer liable for a
civil fine of up to $500 per day.245 In addition, persons who
smoke in a no smoking area may be fined up to $100.211
The Pierce County ordinance should be a model for the
rest of the state to follow. Unfortunately, only the unincorpo-
rated portions of Pierce County currently benefit from its
provisions.
C. Unemployment Compensation
At least four states have granted unemployment benefits
to nonsmokers due to inability to work in a smoke-filled envi-
ronment.241 In In re Carlquist,248 a Yakima accounting clerk
238. SEATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.64.020 (1986).
239. Id § 10.64.040(A).
240. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 113148 (Oct. 29, 1986).
241. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7884 (Dec. 24, 1986).
242. PIERCE COUNTY, WASH., COUNTY CODE §§ 8.16.010-.160 (1986).
243. Id § 8.16.090.
244. Id § 8.16.090(A)(2).
245. Id. § 8.16.120(A)(2).
246. Id § 8.16.120(A).
247. In re Carlquist, No. 406-48-0473-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't Jan. 31,
1986); McCrocklin v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1067, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156
(1984); Stevens v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, No. CE6-2934 (Dist. Ct. Polk County,
Iowa Nov. 17, 1976); Meyer v. C.P. Clare & Co., No. DOE 615-78 (Idaho Indus. Comm'n
Nov. 17, 1978).
248. No. 406-48-0473-7 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't Jan. 31, 1986).
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had a severe allergy to cigarette smoke. After five new smok-
ing employees were hired to work in her office, Ms. Carlquist
asked the employer to provide her with a smoke-free work
area. When the employer declined to accommodate her, she
quit her job.
She then applied for and was granted unemployment com-
pensation benefits. In granting the benefits, the Washington
Employment Security Department found that Ms. Carlquist
left work in accordance with her doctor's advice and only after
making an unsuccessful effort to change the conditions of her
employment. 249 The Department determined that she had
good cause to leave work because continued exposure to
tobacco smoke at work would constitute an unreasonable hard-
ship on her.25 °
In Washington, an employee is not disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits if he or she leaves work vol-
untarily with "good cause. ' 251 The statute provides that a
"risk" to the employee's health or safety can constitute "good
cause."252
Regulations require a "good cause" claimant to demon-
strate three things: (1) that "he or she left work primarily
because of a work connected" factor; (2) that the work con-
nected factor was of "such a compelling nature as to cause a
reasonably prudent person to leave his or her employment";
and (3) that "he or she first exhausted all reasonable alterna-
tives prior to termination," unless this would have been a
futile act.2
53
Therefore, a person who cannot work in a smoke-filled
workplace should not be precluded on that basis from receiv-
ing unemployment benefits provided that he or she can
demonstrate "good cause" for leaving work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Knowledge concerning the harmful effects of involuntary
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (1985).
252. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1985).
253. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 192-16-009(1) (1986). "Good cause" for leaving work
may not exist if the work connected factor "was generally known and present at the
time of hire." Id. § 192-16-009(2). However, this impediment to receiving
unemployment benefits can be overcome if continued employment would constitute
"an unreasonable hardship on the individual." Id. § 192-16-009(2)(c).
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smoking is accumulating rapidly. Accordingly, the Washington
Legislature should promptly enact strong and comprehensive
prohibitions on smoking in the workplace.25
In the absence of state legislation restricting smoking in
private workplaces, several legal theories are available to vin-
dicate the rights of nonsmokers in Washington and other juris-
dictions. These rights can and should be asserted in the courts.
In Washington, the legal theories with the highest probability
of success are the common law right to a safe workplace, and
the claim to handicapped status under either federal or state
law.
Nationally, a comprehensive survey of the case law and
legal principles indicates that nonsmokers wishing to clear the
air have some effective legal remedies at their disposal. In con-
trast, there is no recognized basis in law for the assertion that
one has a right to smoke in the workplace.
This has serious ramifications for employers that fail to
protect their employees from involuntary smoking in the
workplace. In addition to incurring significantly increased
operating costs for permitting such smoking, these employers
will pay a substantial price for their improvidence if an
employee is harmed and commences litigation against the
employer.
254. In December 1986, the Surgeon General stated:
As both a physician and a public health official, it is my judgment that the
time for delay is past; measures to protect the public health are required now.
The scientific case against involuntary smoking as a health risk is more than
sufficient to justify appropriate remedial action, and the goal of any remedial
action must be to protect the nonsmoker from environmental tobacco smoke.
1986 REPORT, supra note 3, at xi-xii (Preface).
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